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Abstract
In many countries worldwide, health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in achieving
population health goals. Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, whereby participants
receive payments in return for a commitment to practise for a period of time in a medically
underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health worker shortages through a number of
mechanisms. First, they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been
educated without financial incentives from well-served to underserved areas. Second, they can add
health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial incentives
and place them in underserved areas. Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the
retention in underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who
would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives. Fourth, the
programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by reducing the
strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, including social isolation, lack
of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical specialists and heavy workload.
We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar objectives
to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term success of financial-
incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from innovative donor financing
schemes, such as endowment funds, international financing facilities or compensation payments);
promotion (programmes should use tested communication channels in order to reach secondary
school graduates and health workers); selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure
programme success and to achieve supplementary policy goals); placement (programmes should
match participants to areas in order to maximize participant satisfaction and retention); support
(programmes should prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact
with participants throughout the different phases of enrolment and help participants by assigning
them mentors, establishing peer support systems or financing education courses relevant to work
in underserved areas); enforcement (programmes may use community-based monitoring or
outsource enforcement to existing institutions); and evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence
on the effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas,
programmes in developing countries should evaluate their performance; in order to improve the
strength of the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experiments should
be conducted where feasible).
Published: 26 June 2009
Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 doi:10.1186/1478-4491-7-52
Received: 28 July 2008
Accepted: 26 June 2009
This article is available from: http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
© 2009 Bärnighausen and Bloom; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
Page 2 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically
underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages – unlike initiatives using non-
financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in underserved areas
and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by health workers – as well as
disadvantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they may not improve the working
and living conditions in underserved areas (which are important determinants of health workers'
long-term retention) and, unlike compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will
supply health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without
financial incentives. Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not
mutually exclusive and may positively affect each other's performance.
Background
In many countries, one of the main constraints in achiev-
ing population health goals is the lack of health workers.
The 2004 Joint Learning Initiative (JLI) for Human
Resources for Health estimated that "[s]ub-Saharan coun-
tries must nearly triple their current numbers of workers
by adding the equivalent of one million workers through
retention, recruitment, and training if they are to come
close to approaching the MDGs [Millennium Develop-
ment Goals] for health" [1], and the 2006 World Health
Report concluded that "[t]he severity of the health work-
force crisis in some of the world's poorest countries is
illustrated by WHO estimates that 57 of them (36 of
which are in Africa) have a deficit of 2.4 million doctors,
nurses and midwives" [2].
Interventions to alleviate health worker shortages in med-
ically underserved areas include selective recruitment of
those individuals into health care education who are most
likely to work in such areas, training specifically for under-
served practice, improvements in working or living condi-
tions in underserved areas, compulsion or incentives [3].
The topic of the present article is financial incentives for
return of medical service in underserved areas: a health
worker enters into a contract to practise for a number of
years in an underserved area in exchange for a financial
payoff.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of five different types of
financial-incentive programmes that have been described
in the literature [4-6]: service-requiring scholarships
("conditional scholarships") (e.g. [7-9]), educational
Table 1: Types of financial-incentive for return of service programmes
Type of programme Time of commitment Time of money receipt Spending restrictions Type of obligation
Service-requiring 
scholarships 
("conditional scholarships")
Before the start of health 
care education or early in 
the course of health care 
education
During health care 
education
Money earmarked for 
health care education
Service*
Educational loans with 
service requirement
Before the start of health 
care education or early in 
the course of health care 
education
During health care 
education
Money earmarked for 
health care education
Service and financial 
repayment*
Service-option educational 
loans
Before the start of health 
care education or early in 
the course of health care 
education
During health care 
education
Money earmarked for 
health care education
Service or financial 
repayment
Loan repayment 
programmes
After completion of health 
care education
After completion of health 
care education, during 
committed service
Money earmarked to pay 
back educational debt
Service*
Direct financial incentives After completion of health 
care education
After completion of health 
care education, during 
committed service
Money can be used for any 
purpose
Service*
*Programme may have a buy-out option.Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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loans with service requirement (e.g. [10]), service-option
educational loans (e.g. [11]), loan repayment pro-
grammes (e.g. [12]), and direct financial incentives (e.g.
[13]). These programme types differ according to the time
a (future) health worker commits to participation (before,
during or after completion of health care education), the
time when participants receive monetary payments (dur-
ing or after completion of health care education), spend-
ing restrictions on the received payments (for educational
purposes only or for any purpose), and the type of obliga-
tion (service and/or financial repayment).
All service-option educational loan programmes offer a
choice between service and repayment of the financial
incentive. The other four types of programmes commonly
offer a "buy-out" option. Service-requiring scholarships
with a buy-out option are similar to service-option educa-
tion loans. However, while programme managers of serv-
ice-option loans normally consider repayment and service
equally desirable outcomes, managers of service-requiring
scholarships prefer service over buy-out. Buy-out is thus
usually more expensive than financial repayment.
All five types of financial-incentive programmes can
potentially serve to increase the numbers of health work-
ers in underserved areas through four mechanisms. First,
they may increase the supply of those health workers who
would have been educated without financial incentive in
underserved areas by decreasing the supply in well-served
areas. For instance, they may decrease the net emigration
flows of nurses and physicians from the developing world
to developed countries [14-16]. This first mechanism can
take hold if there are health workers who normally would
not work in underserved areas, but who are willing to do
so in return for a financial incentive.
Second, they may add health workers to the pool of work-
ers who would have been educated without financial
incentives and place them in underserved areas. This sec-
ond mechanism can take hold if there are qualified candi-
dates who normally would not have the means to finance
a health care education, but who can afford to do so if
they receive financial incentives, and if a country's health
care education system can absorb additional students.
Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the
retention in underserved areas of those health workers
who participate in a programme, but who would have
worked in an underserved area without financial incen-
tive. Retention may increase, for instance, if programme
participants fulfil their contracts and contractual obliga-
tions are longer than the times they would have remained
in an underserved area without financial incentive.
Fourth, programmes may increase the retention of all
health workers in underserved areas by improving the
supply of health workers to underserved areas and thus
reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health
workers leave such areas, e.g. social isolation [17], lack of
contact with colleagues [18], lack of support from medical
specialists [19], or heavy workload [17,18,20]).
We have previously shown that a specific type of financial-
incentive programme, scholarships in return for a com-
mitment to deliver antiretroviral treatment in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, is highly cost-beneficial under a wide range of
assumptions [21]. In a recent systematic review, we iden-
tified 43 studies evaluating financial incentive pro-
grammes for return of service [22]. With the exception of
one study from rural South Africa [7], all the reviewed
studies evaluate programmes in developed countries (33
studies took place in the United States, five in Japan, two
in Canada, and one New Zealand).
While financial-incentive programmes in other countries
have not been evaluated in published studies, they have
nevertheless been used, for instance in Swaziland [23],
Ghana [24], and Mexico [25]. Additional file 1 shows an
overview of studies of financial-incentive programme
results (i.e. descriptions of outcomes among programme
participants), programme effects (i.e. analysis of pro-
gramme effectiveness at the individual level through com-
parison of outcomes among participants and non-
participants), and programme impacts (i.e. analysis of
programme effectiveness at the population level, such as
changes in physician density or population mortality)
[22]. The table describes the type of study, the type of out-
come observed in the study and the main study findings.
While the majority of published studies on financial-
incentive programmes examine programmes for doctors
[22], a number of articles investigate programmes that
enrol other health professionals in addition to doctors,
such as nurses, pharmacists or dentists [7,11,26]. Many
aspects of the management of a financial-incentive pro-
gramme are not specific to one type of health worker. In
most instances in this article, we thus use the general term
"health workers" rather than the name of any specific cat-
egory of health worker.
Please also note that the definition of medically unders-
erved area varies by country and programme. In general, a
medically underserved area is an area where the number
of health workers falls below a target. There are, however,
many different methods to determine health worker tar-
gets, including methods based on need (i.e. the number of
health workers necessary to achieve certain population
health goals), demand (i.e. the number of health workers
sufficient to deliver the health services demanded byHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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patients), or supply (i.e. the number of health workers
sufficient to staff existing health care facilities). Com-
monly, a mix of need, demand and supply criteria is used
in the definition of underserved area [22]. In this article,
we use the term "medically underserved area" to denote
any area that has been identified as a placement site for
health workers enrolled in financial-incentive pro-
grammes, independent of the particular definition used.
Financial-incentive programmes recruit substantial pro-
portions of participants to underserved areas (the ran-
dom-effects estimate of the pooled recruitment
proportion across the studies in our systematic review was
71% (95% confidence interval 60% to 80%)) [22]. More
importantly, a number of studies have found that pro-
gramme participants are more likely than health workers
who do not participate in a financial-incentive pro-
gramme to remain in underserved areas in the long run
[27-30]. While the existing studies have not established
causality of programme effects to the exclusion of all other
possible explanations for observed difference between
programme participants and non-participants [22], over-
all the evidence to date suggests that financial-incentive
programmes can be effective in increasing the supply of
health workers to underserved areas (see Additional file
1).
Financial-incentive programmes may be an attractive
intervention to place health workers in underserved areas
for a number of additional reasons. First, they can subsi-
dize the education of poor students, thus potentially
increasing equity of access to higher education. Second,
unlike many of the other strategies to attract health work-
ers to underserved areas (such as selective recruitment and
training or improvements in working and living condi-
tions [3]), they establish legally enforceable commitments
to work in underserved areas and should thus more relia-
bly increase the size of the health workforce in unders-
erved areas. Third, unlike compulsory service policies,
they are unlikely to be opposed by health workers.
However, financial-incentive programmes are not easy to
implement [11,24,31,32]. In this article, we discuss seven
management functions essential for the long-term success
of financial-incentive programmes (Figure 1). First, pro-
grammes need a sustainable source of financing to pay for
the financial incentives and programme administration
(financing). Next, programmes need to promote their
offers in order to attract candidates for participation (pro-
motion), select participants out of the pool of candidates
(selection), and place the selected participants in medi-
cally underserved areas (placement). Finally, programmes
should support the participants during all phases of enrol-
ment (support), enforce the service obligations (enforce-
ment), and evaluate whether programme objectives are
achieved (evaluation).
In the following, we describe insights from published
studies regarding how these seven management functions
can be performed. We draw not only on studies of finan-
cial-incentive programmes, but also on initiatives whose
objectives or functions partially overlap with those of
financial-incentive programmes. For instance, educa-
tional-loan programmes share with financial-incentive
programmes the objective to recruit participants to receive
financial support for education and the management
functions of financing, promotion, selection, support,
enforcement and evaluation; compulsory service policies
share with financial-incentive programmes the objective
to increase the supply of qualified workers to certain com-
munities and the management functions of placement,
support, enforcement and evaluation.
Management functions of financial-incentive programmes Figure 1
Management functions of financial-incentive programmes.
 
 
 
               
     Enforcement      Evaluation       Support       Placement       Selection       Promotion  Financing 
Definition  •  Source of 
financing to pay for 
financial incentives 
and programme 
administration 
 
•  Promotion of 
programmes to 
attract 
candidates for 
participation 
•  Selection of 
participants out 
of the pool of 
candidates 
•  Placement of 
participants in 
medically 
underserved 
areas 
•  Ongoing 
contact with 
participants and 
support during 
all stages of 
enrolment 
•  Monitoring  
and enforcement 
of contract 
fulfilment 
•  Evaluation 
of programme 
performance 
Literature 
source 
•  Donor-financed 
endowment funds 
•  Health risk 
reduction 
programmes 
•  Selective 
recruitment for 
health care 
education 
•  Compulsory 
service 
•  Financial-
incentive 
programmes 
 
•  Educational 
loans 
•  Financial-
incentive 
programmes Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
Page 5 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
The seven management functions
First function: financing
Four of the five types of financial-incentive programmes
shown in Table 1 necessarily require ongoing external
financing, while one type (educational loans with service
requirement) could theoretically finance itself in the long
term if the total amount of money repaid equalled or
exceeded programme expenditures. However, such a
steady state of revolving refinance will take a long time to
achieve, because student loans will start to be repaid only
after many years of initial investment [33]. Moreover,
both in developed and in developing countries, existing
student loan programmes usually require financial injec-
tions even in the long term, because losses due to unem-
ployment, default, illness or refusal to repay are usually
not priced into the repayment amounts. If they were, such
programmes would not be an attractive option for educa-
tion finance for many eligible students [34]. While sub-
stantial long-term finance is thus usually required for the
incentive programmes, in many developing countries
public finance for such programmes may not be available
because governments commonly receive only limited tax
revenues, face borrowing constraints, or may not be able
to increase the proportion of public finance allocated to
spending on education for political reasons [35].
An alternative is to finance the incentive programmes
through aid from donors. However, traditional donor
financing may not be well-suited for this purpose, which
may explain why large international donors rarely support
financial-incentive programmes. For one, donors tend to
finance projects for periods that may not be sufficiently
long to create sustainable programmes and they may be
reluctant to provide "running cost" support for training
health workers [35]. The latter problem is highlighted by
recent discussions about whether large disease-specific aid
agencies, e.g. PEPFAR, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the GAVI Alliance, should
invest in human resources for health in developing coun-
tries [1,36-38].
In addition, countries that cannot achieve an intended
increase in the rate of health worker education through
financial-incentive programmes because of limited educa-
tion capacity may need substantial start-up financing to
build educational institutions and to educate health care
teachers. The relatively constant flows of traditional donor
financing may not allow substantial initial investment
with lower rates of continuing finance.
Recent innovation in donor funding may address both
shortcomings. On the one hand, donor-financed endow-
ment funds [39] can provide steady long-term money
flows well-suited to fund scholarships, loans and salary
support. On the other hand, organizations such as the
International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm)
[40] can leverage development aid by issuing bonds on
international capital markets against long-term commit-
ments of annual payments from donor nations in order to
"frontload" aid, allowing immediate large-scale invest-
ments (such as in education infrastructure) [41].
In particular situations, countries may be able to increase
education rates of health workers through financial-incen-
tive programmes without large start-up investment in
additional health care education capacity. For instance,
some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland, fund their citizens' health care
education in other countries, if the prospective health
workers commit to service in their home countries after
graduation. However, this strategy may only be feasible
for countries with relatively small population sizes and
good relationships with countries that have unused health
care education capacity. Moreover, the strategy carries the
danger that health care workers educated abroad will not
return to their country of origin [42]. Financial-incentive
programmes could also be used to motivate health work-
ers from relatively well-served countries to practise in
underserved countries [43], in which case the latter would
benefit from education capacity in the former [44].
Another financing option for financial-incentive pro-
grammes would be compensation payments from coun-
tries receiving health workers to those countries losing
them. It has been argued that developed countries that
recruit health workers from African countries with severe
health worker shortages have an ethical obligation to
compensate the governments of these countries for the
loss [45]. While there may be a number of practical prob-
lems in implementing compensation payments – for
instance, the 2005 Report of the Global Commission on Inter-
national Migration [46] points out that migrating profes-
sionals commonly work in more than one country, in
which case it is unclear which country is responsible for
the payments – financial-incentive programmes seem an
especially fitting purpose on which to spend such pay-
ments, because they would contribute to decreasing simi-
lar losses in the future.
Second function: promotion
The pool of potential candidates to apply for participation
in a financial-incentive programme depends on the start
of the programme relative to the stage of health care edu-
cation (Table 1). In the case of service-requiring scholar-
ships, educational loans with service requirement and
service-option loans, potential candidates will be the sec-
ondary school graduates who are qualified to pursue a
health care education [35]. In the case of loan repayments
and direct financial incentives, it will be fully qualified
health care professionals who are eligible for participa-Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
Page 6 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
tion. The ratio of potential to de facto applicants will
depend on the knowledge of the programme among eligi-
ble people, as well as the attractiveness of the programme
conditions.
There is little published evidence about how secondary
school students attain knowledge of tertiary education,
including financing options [47-50]. However, a range of
communication channels have been successfully used to
increase students' knowledge of behaviours to reduce
health risks [51]. They include classroom or group ses-
sions led by teachers [52,53] or peers [54,55], or printed
material [56]. As postgraduate students and health care
professionals commonly use the internet [57-61] and
electronic mail [62-64] to obtain and exchange medical
information, financial-incentive programmes for fully
qualified health workers may be successfully promoted
through advertisements on web sites or through email
campaigns.
Third function: selection
Selection of programme participants from among all can-
didates who apply for a place in a financial-incentive pro-
gramme can contribute to achieving the main objective of
the programme, i.e. to increase the supply of health work-
ers to medically underserved areas, as well as supplemen-
tary policy goals. One strategy to maximize the
effectiveness of the programme in increasing the supply of
health workers to underserved areas is to select candidates
based on characteristics observed to be associated with a
low probability of defaulting on the service obligation
and a high probability of remaining in an underserved
area after completion of the obligation.
There is evidence from both developing countries [65-67]
and developed countries [65,68-72] that health care grad-
uates from rural background are more likely to choose
rural practice than their peers from urban areas. For
instance, a 2003 study in South Africa found that 10 years
after graduating from medical school, doctors of rural ori-
gin were 3.5 times more likely than doctors of urban ori-
gin to practise in rural areas [67].
In settings where the selected students would have
attained a health care degree even if they had not received
a financial incentive, selection on factors associated with
the propensity to work in underserved areas will not con-
tribute to programme effectiveness – unless programme
participation has an effect on the propensity to work and
remain in underserved areas and this effect differs by the
selection factors. However, in settings where without the
financial support from a programme large proportions of
the selected students would have been unable to finance a
health care education, selective recruitment is likely to
improve programme effectiveness because it can change
the composition of health care students, such that the
average propensity for underserved practise increases.
Policy-makers can also use selection into a financial-
incentive programme to achieve supplementary health
care education goals. For instance, financial equity of
access to tertiary education can be improved by basing eli-
gibility for the financial incentive on means tests [73].
Merit can be rewarded by basing eligibility on secondary
school performance. The proportion of students from
groups who are traditionally underrepresented in health
care education can be increased if financial incentives are
preferentially given to members of these groups.
Fourth function: placement
Placement of programme participants in particular under-
served areas is likely to be an important determinant of
programme success. Policy-makers first need to agree on a
definition of "medically underserved area". Some pro-
grammes in developed countries have used simple defini-
tions of "medically underserved areas" (e.g. rural
communities with populations of 5000 or less [74] or
towns or villages with populations of 2500 or less [10]),
while others have used a range of need, demand, and sup-
ply criteria (e.g. population health, demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics of the population, and cur-
rent health worker-to-population ratios [75,76]) to iden-
tify areas.
Once areas have been designated as "medically unders-
erved", the programme participants need to be matched
to underserved areas. In order to maximize the social
value of financial-incentive programmes, policy-makers
could consider placing participants preferentially in those
underserved areas where unmet health care need is great-
est, because the impact of a placement on population
health in these areas is likely to be most significant.
Without such a preferential placement policy, it is possi-
ble that the neediest populations will benefit least from
financial-incentive programmes. For instance, a study of
the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), a national
financial-incentive programme that has operated in the
United States since 1972 [77], found that the poorer an
underserved area eligible to receive an NHSC physician
and the worse its population health, the less likely it was
to receive a physician through the programme [78].
However, such a policy would strongly restrict partici-
pants' choice of placement area. As a result, participants
may be less likely to be satisfied with their work and per-
sonal life during the obligated service, decreasing the
chances of long-term retention in the placement area. A
study of the NHSC found that NHSC enrolees "placed in
rural sites in the late 1980s experienced a site-matchingHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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process that they felt offered few acceptable sites" and
"offered little opportunity to locate the best-suited site
among those offered" [32]. A study from South Africa con-
cluded that physicians were dissatisfied with their place-
ments for compulsory community service because they
were forced to serve in a particular location and because
they felt that the placement disrupted their social lives
[79] – two problems that should be less likely to occur if
programme participants were given the choice to serve in
one of many underserved areas.
A number of studies in the United States found that pro-
gramme participants were significantly less likely to
remain in the same underserved area over time than
health workers who worked in underserved areas but had
not participated in any financial-incentive programme
[12,27,32,80]. However, several other studies in the
United States found that participants in financial-incen-
tive programmes are more likely to continue to practice in
some underserved area [27,32] or to provide care to an
underserved population [28,30,32] than health workers
who had chosen – without financial incentive – to start
practising in an underserved area at the same time that
programme participants started serving their obligations.
These findings can be explained as follows. Participants in
financial-incentive programmes are more likely to practise
in underserved areas in the long run than those non-par-
ticipants who at some point in time choose to work in an
underserved area. However, participants are not placed in
their preferred underserved area. Thus, participants relo-
cate from the placement area to their preferred unders-
erved area after having completed their service obligation.
Financial-incentive programmes aiming to attain high
retention of obligated health workers in the placement
area should attempt to accommodate health workers'
wishes to practise in particular underserved areas as far as
possible. Optimal placement could be achieved, for
instance, by a matching process such as the one used for
specialist training places in the United States, whereby
candidates and training institutions rank each other in
order of declining preference and a computer algorithm
implements explicit rules to identify the best assignment
of candidates to institutions [81].
Fifth function: support
It is likely that the satisfaction of health workers with their
participation in financial-incentive programmes will be
important in determining whether they start and com-
plete their service obligations and whether they remain in
an underserved area in the long run [80]. Evidence from
the United States shows that participants' work and life
satisfaction can vary substantially by programme type
[12,80]. Such differences across programmes can be due
to a number of reasons.
Different types of health workers may choose to partici-
pate in different programmes, and programmes may differ
in how far they take participants' wishes into account in
selecting placement areas (see above). However, pro-
grammes may also be able to influence participants' satis-
faction before and during their time of service by offering
support. For instance, the NHSC has developed "tools to
prepare providers for underserved areas", which include
learning modules on "personal and professional develop-
ment", "cross cultural issues in primary care", "leading
group discussions", and health care issues important in
working with "disenfranchised populations" (such as
adolescent pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, child abuse, domestic
violence or substance abuse) [82]. In addition, the NHSC
has established a "recruitment, training and support
center" which maintains contact with underserved areas,
offers "guidance and support to NHSC scholars during the
relocation process" and monitors participants during
their service [83].
The Friends of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme (FOMSS),
which provides scholarships to health care students from
the rural Umkhanyakude district of South Africa in return
for a commitment to work in the district after graduation
[84], assigns each participant a mentor. The mentor sup-
ports the participant during her studies: "Regular visits to
the campuses supplemented by telephone calls by the
main mentor made the students feel that he was there for
them and that he cared. Struggling students were encour-
aged to analyse their situation using questions such as
'What do you think is the problem?' and 'What have you
done to find a solution?'. Wherever practicable, solutions
were found quickly and included interventions such as
the student (and sometimes the mentor) contacting a lec-
turer or head of department, finding better accommoda-
tion, or providing a computer for FOMSS students where
university resources were inadequate, etc." [7].
As described for FOMSS, ongoing contact with partici-
pants enables managers of financial-incentive pro-
grammes to detect difficulties that health workers are
facing and to intervene speedily. In addition to assigning
participants to mentors, programmes can ensure that they
remain in close contact with participants through regular
meetings with individual health workers, discussions with
groups of participants, telephone hotlines [83], or fre-
quent surveys of participant satisfaction [19,85,86]. Pro-
grammes can offer support by initiating peer group
meetings [79], establishing peer-support systems, such as
Balint groups [87], paying for education courses that teach
skills relevant to health care in underserved areas [88], orHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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funding equipment that participants need in their clinical
work.
Sixth function: enforcement
Programme participants can default on their obligation in
several different ways. In programmes without a repay-
ment or buy-out option, they can, firstly, refuse placement
and service after having received the financial incentive
and, secondly, comply with the placement but fail to per-
form the specific duties they are obliged to perform in the
placement area. An example of the latter type of default is
a physician who fails to fulfil her obligation to work in a
public-sector hospital in the placement area and instead
sees patients in private practice. While the first type of
default is comparatively easy to detect (for instance,
through spot checks or calls to local hospital administra-
tors), the second type can be difficult to detect (for
instance, if the health services administration in the place-
ment area is weak). In programmes with a buy-out option,
participants default if they neither fulfil their service obli-
gation nor repay the financial incentive.
In order to ensure that participants fulfil their obligations,
programmes must have a monitoring strategy in place to
identify defaulters, as well as a strategy to deal with
detected defaulters. The strategies will depend on legal,
institutional and technological factors specific to a coun-
try. Experiences from educational-loan programmes in
Africa suggest that rather than building up an infrastruc-
ture to monitor defaults on service or financial obliga-
tions themselves, financial-incentive programmes should
outsource this function to existing institutions that
already have the structures and experience to deal with
contractual default, such as the tax system, the social secu-
rity system or banks [73].
An alternative to using such large existing systems to mon-
itor participants is community-based monitoring
approaches [89], including monitoring through local
leaders, citizen report cards ("participatory surveys that
provide quantitative feedback on user perceptions on the
quality, adequacy and efficiency of public services", i.e.
the services of health workers participating in financial-
incentive programmes [90]), or community score cards
("qualitative monitoring tools that are used for local level
monitoring and performance evaluation of services"
[90]). Community-based monitoring may be preferable
for relatively small local financial-incentive programmes.
Monitoring and punishment are reactive approaches to
reduce default. Preventive strategies to decrease default
rates include regulation, such as withholding diplomas or
licenses from scholarship recipients until they have com-
pleted their service [35], requiring completion of the obli-
gated service for specialist training [66], or restricting the
visa eligibility of obligated health workers before comple-
tion of their service [15].
Seventh function: evaluation
A large number of descriptive case studies and cohort
studies have evaluated financial-incentive programmes
(Additional file 1) [22]. However, with one exception
from South Africa [7], all of the published evaluations
have taken place in industrialized countries. In order to
improve the scope of the existing evidence, financial-
incentive programmes in developing countries should
collect quantitative and qualitative data on their experi-
ences and outcomes and publish them.
While the evidence on the effects of financial-incentive
programmes on recruitment and long-term retention in
underserved areas is extensive, it has a number of limita-
tions. For one, the evidence may not be generalizable to
many of the countries that suffer from the most severe
shortages of health workers in rural and remote areas, in
particular sub-Saharan African countries. The majority of
published evaluations of financial-incentive programmes
took place in the United States (Additional file 1). The
United States health care education system, however, is
unusual in comparison to many other countries in that
students pay a high tuition for their education. Within the
United States, it has been found that medical students'
propensity to enrol in a financial-incentive programme
increases with their debt burden [32]. Thus, it would seem
plausible that in countries where health care education is
subsidized to such an extent that students have to pay very
little tuition, financial-incentive programmes could be
substantially less attractive than in the United States.
However, in a number of countries with very low tuition
for health care education, students nevertheless incur sub-
stantial expenses, for instance, for housing, meals, medi-
cal textbooks and equipment [91], requiring them to seek
funding support, for instance, through a financial-incen-
tive programme. Future studies should evaluate outcomes
of financial-incentive programmes in developing coun-
tries, such as Swaziland [23], Ghana [24], and Mexico
[25].
Another fundamental difference between the United
States and many of the developing countries that currently
face severe health worker shortages is that the income dif-
ferential between underserved and well-served areas is
larger in the latter than in the former. Pathman and col-
leagues find that United States physicians fulfilling a serv-
ice commitment in underserved areas did not earn
significantly less than physicians without such an obliga-
tion [32].Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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In contrast, in many developing countries health workers
in private practice earn substantially more than their col-
leagues in the public sector, and opportunities for full-
time or part-time work in private practice may exist only
in well-served urban areas and not in rural and remote
areas where financial-incentive programmes offer posi-
tions. Insofar as financial incentives simply compensate
for income differentials between underserved and well-
served areas, they are unlikely to be attractive. Salary
mark-ups specifically for participants in financial-incen-
tive programmes, on the other hand, may not be feasible
because they would imply that participants earn more
than non-participants working in underserved areas,
which may be difficult to justify.
Thus, in some developing countries, financial incentive
programmes similar to the ones offered in the United
States and other developed countries may not be success-
ful unless the incomes of all health workers in unders-
erved areas are increased. An example of such a universal
change in salary structures is the "rural allowance" in
South Africa, which was added in 2004 to the salaries of
public-sector health workers in rural areas [92]. In some
countries, work in underserved areas would be financially
more attractive if health workers were allowed to rotate
between the public sector in underserved areas and the
private sector in well-served areas.
Another limitation of the evidence is that it is exclusively
based on observational studies, which do not allow to
firmly establish a causal relationship between programme
participation and work in underserved areas. It seems
plausible that financial-incentive programmes place
health workers in underserved areas who would never
have worked in such areas.
Furthermore, financial-incentive programmes may expose
participants who would have worked in an underserved
area without financial incentive to experiences that they
would not have had, had they not enrolled. Such pro-
gramme-specific experiences (e.g. preparation for work in
the underserved area and mentoring during the obligated
service) could increase participants' propensity to work in
underserved areas in the long run.
While such effects are plausible, it is difficult to rule out
the possibility that those workers who choose to partici-
pate would have practised in underserved areas for exactly
the same length of time (or even longer) without a finan-
cial incentive. In order to strengthen the evidence on the
effects of financial-incentive programmes, researchers
should conduct controlled experiments, wherever funders
and policy-makers are willing to support such studies.
Comparison of financial-incentive programmes 
with other interventions to increase the supply 
of health workers in underserved areas
Financial-incentive programmes are only one type of
intervention to increase the supply of health workers in
underserved areas. Two other types are compulsory service
and non-financial incentives. In the following, we will
briefly describe these two types of alternative interven-
tions and contrast them with financial-incentive pro-
grammes.
Compulsory service versus financial-incentive programmes
Compulsory service policies require health workers (e.g.
all doctors or all nurses) who are educated in a country to
work for a period of time in an underserved area in that
country. Such programmes have been established in many
countries worldwide.
Beginning in the 1920s, the Soviet Union required all
medical, dental and nursing graduates to serve for three
years in rural areas [93]. In 1936, Mexico started requiring
six months of rural service as a condition for medical stu-
dents to graduate from medical school. The six-month
requirement was later extended to one year [94]. Other
countries in Latin America followed with similar pro-
grammes, including Cuba (in 1960) [95], the Dominican
Republic (in the 1960s) [96,97], Ecuador (in 1970) [94],
and Bolivia (in 1979) [94]. In Africa, Nigeria established
a National Youth Service Corps in 1973, which requires
all graduates of tertiary education institutions, including
health workers, to work for one year in an underserved
area [98]. Since 1998, all South African medical graduates
have to perform a one-year "compulsory community serv-
ice" [79]. Compulsory service policies also exist in South
Asia (e.g. in several states of India [99,100]), the Eastern
Mediterranean (e.g. Iraq [101]) and Europe (e.g. Greece
[102]).
While compulsory service is used widely, the evidence on
its performance is scarce. The 2007 United States Council
on Graduate Medical Education Report New Paradigms for
Physician Training for Improving Access to Health Care comes
to the conclusion that "[t]he impact of these [compulsory
service] programmes had been difficult to assess, and
there is a dearth of rigorous studies of their effectiveness
and viability. It is clear from existing information that it is
possible to create and sustain such programmes over a
period of decades, although not necessarily with enthusi-
astic support of those required to serve" [95].
The evidence that does exist is mainly on the satisfaction
of health workers with their compulsory service. An eval-
uation of the South African compulsory community serv-
ice finds that 64% of the doctors felt that "they had
developed professionally" during the service, but thatHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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their development had taken place mostly "in the area of
gaining confidence and insight in themselves as practi-
tioners, as opposed to formal learning of clinical skills
from supervisors" [79]. Similarly, a study in Ecuador
reports that 94% of health workers found "their [compul-
sory] year of rural service rewarding both personally and
professionally" [94]. Many of the participants "com-
mented on how much they learned about doctor-patient
relations" and "[s]ome said they matured emotionally,
learned the meaning of responsibility, and acquired
greater self-confidence" [94].
Because very few empirical studies have been published
on compulsory service, a comparison of the programmes
to financial-incentive programmes has to be based on the-
oretical considerations. Table 2 outlines differences in the
characteristics and possible effects between the two types
of interventions.
The main difference is, of course, that compulsory service
policies force all health workers (in a particular category)
to serve, while financial-incentive programmes enrol only
those health workers who choose to participate. Thus,
compulsory service policies (if they can be enforced)
ensure that a substantial proportion of workers who –
given the choice – would never have practised in unders-
erved areas do so for some period and that, at least in the
short term, such requirements will be effective in increas-
ing the supply of health workers to underserved areas. In
contrast, financial-incentive programmes cannot ensure
that they will be effective in recruiting health workers to
underserved areas who would not have chosen to do so
without financial incentive.
Compulsion, however, implies a "loss of autonomy" and
can create an "aversion", which may lead to a number of
negative consequences [95]. For one, the introduction of
compulsory service may be difficult politically. For
instance, in 2008, a strike of medical students and doctors
forced the government of Kerala, India, to reduce the
planned compulsory rural service for doctors from three
years to one year [103,104]. Further, it is possible that
health workers who are forced to work in an underserved
area for some period are less likely to voluntarily work in
such an area and more likely to emigrate to another coun-
try in the long run.
Moreover, compulsory service may decrease the attractive-
ness of a health care education because it limits graduates'
choices of where to work. As such, compulsory service
could lead to fewer applicants to health care education
institutions, which could reduce the total number of
health workers educated per time (if the number of edu-
cation places exceeds the number of qualified applicants)
[35], or decrease the average quality of health care stu-
dents (if education institutions lower entry requirements
in order to fill their education places) [95]. In contrast,
financial-incentive programmes could increase the total
number of educated health workers and increase the pro-
portion of students from poor backgrounds, if the finan-
cial incentives enable students who would otherwise not
have been able to do so to pay for a health care education,
and if a country's education system can absorb the addi-
tional students.
Non-financial incentives versus financial incentives
Health workers are motivated not only by financial com-
pensation but also by other factors, such as altruism, the
satisfaction of successfully applying their skills in caring
for their patients and recognition from their peers. For
instance, a study in Benin and Kenya found in semistruc-
tured interviews that nurses and doctors more commonly
referred to "healing patients", "vocation", "professional
satisfaction" and "recognition by supervisors" than to
"remuneration" when asked what currently encourages
them to do their work well [105].
Table 2: Comparison of financial-incentive programmes to compulsory service
Financial-incentive programmes Compulsory service
Enrolment Self-selected Universal
Compulsion No Yes
Length of service Commonly >3 years Commonly 1–3 years
Effect on equity of access to tertiary education Improvement possible None
Effect on total number of health workers Increase possible Decrease possible
Effect on composition of health worker 
population
Increase in proportion of health workers from 
poor backgrounds possible
Increase in proportion of lower-quality health 
workers possibleHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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A study in rural Viet Nam found that "the main motivat-
ing factors for health workers were appreciation by man-
agers, colleagues and the community, a stable job and
income and training", while "the main discouraging fac-
tors were related to low salaries and difficult working con-
ditions" [106]. As such, non-financial factors should be
expected to influence the supply of health workers in
underserved areas.
A WHO study found that while health workers in the pub-
lic sector in Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda and
Zimbabwe most commonly considered "salaries" as one
of the "key issues ... that will motivate them to remain in
the country" (between 68% and 85% of the respondents
in the five countries), they also considered non-financial
factors to be important in their migration decisions – for
instance, the "working environment" (between 36% and
81%) and "opportunities for education and training"
(between 29% and 67%) [107].
In addition to such work-related factors, living conditions
are likely to be important in determining health workers'
decisions to move to and remain in underserved areas. In
Ecuador, health workers fulfilling their compulsory serv-
ice ranked transportation "highest as an adaptation prob-
lem, followed by, in descending order, communication,
housing, food, and access to potable water and electrical
power" [94].
In the United States, physicians working in the Navajo
Area India Health Services referred to "the poor local
school system" and "marginal housing facilities" as rea-
sons why they might leave their positions [108]. Rural
doctors in Limpopo, a poor rural province of South Africa,
provided a range of themes in response to the question
about which interventions they thought would retain
South African doctors in rural hospital service in the prov-
ince, including financial incentives ("increasing salaries
and rural allowances"), improvements in working condi-
tions (such as "ensuring career progression", "providing
continuing medical education", "improving the physical
hospital infrastructure and rural referral systems", "ensur-
ing the availability of essential medical equipment and
medicines", and "strengthening rural hospital manage-
ment"), and improvements in living conditions (such as
"improving rural hospital accommodation", "providing
recreational facilities", and "assisting rural doctors' fami-
lies") [19].
Work-related factors that affect health workers' location
choices can potentially be influenced through investment
in health care facilities, medical equipment and work-
place safety [35], as well as through a range of manage-
ment interventions [109,110], such as training of
supervisors [35], "quality improvement teams", "team
building", "participatory problem assessments and prob-
lem-solving processes", and "development of career
development plans" [105]. Living conditions can be
improved through investment in infrastructure in unders-
erved areas, such as roads, electricity, telecommunication,
water, sanitation and housing. However, only a few coun-
tries (such as Thailand [111] and Zambia [112]) have
implemented interventions to improve health workers'
working or living conditions in underserved areas, and
evidence on their effectiveness in increasing the supply of
health workers in those areas is largely lacking [3,113].
In thinking about alternative interventions to increase the
supply of health workers in underserved areas, govern-
ments and donors should bear in mind that such inter-
ventions are usually not mutually exclusive. For instance,
in South Africa the national compulsory community serv-
ice [79] operates alongside national [92] and local [7]
financial-incentive programmes. Non-financial incentives
improving health workers' satisfaction with their profes-
sional and personal lives could be important in improv-
ing long-term retention of health workers in areas to
which they were originally attracted by a financial incen-
tive [22]. Zambia established a "Health Workers Reten-
tion Scheme" to improve the supply of doctors to "rural
and underserved parts of Zambia". The scheme provides a
financial incentive (a "rural hardship allowance") and
several non-financial incentives, including guaranteed eli-
gibility for postgraduate training after three years of serv-
ice and investment to improve housing for health workers
in underserved areas [112].
Policy-makers should further consider that on the contin-
uum from incentive to compulsion there are intermediate
forms of interventions, which may be the best choices in
particular situations. For instance, in some countries prac-
tice in underserved area is not compulsory but necessary
or desirable for acceptance into specialist training pro-
grammes [114]. Incentives, on the other hand, can come
in the form of cash payments to the health worker, ear-
marked allowances for housing or schooling, fringe bene-
fits (such as old-age pension or health insurance), and
improvements in living and working conditions in under-
served areas [35].
Conclusion
Financial-incentive programmes for return of medical
service in underserved areas have been used in both devel-
oped and developing countries. The existing literature on
financial-incentive programmes and related interventions
suggests a number of ways how the seven management
functions that are essential for the long-term success of
financial-incentive programmes can be successfully
implemented:Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:52 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/52
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￿ financing (programmes may benefit from innovative
donor financing schemes, such endowment funds, inter-
national financing facilities or compensation payments);
￿ promotion (programmes should use tested communica-
tion channels in order to reach secondary school gradu-
ates and health workers);
￿ selection (programmes may use selection criteria to
ensure programme success and to achieve supplementary
policy goals);
￿ placement (programmes may use matching of partici-
pants to areas to ensure programme success);
￿ support (programmes should prepare participants for
their time in an underserved area, stay in close contact
with participants throughout the different phases of
enrolment and help participants by assigning them men-
tors, establishing peer support systems or financing edu-
cation courses relevant to work in underserved areas);
￿ enforcement (programmes may use community-based
monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institu-
tions);
￿ evaluation (in order to increase the scope of evidence on
the effectiveness of financial incentives in supplying
health workers to underserved areas, programmes in
developing countries should evaluate their performance;
in order to improve the strength of the evidence on the
effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experi-
ments should be conducted where feasible).
Financial-incentive programmes have a number of advan-
tages and disadvantages in comparison with other inter-
ventions to increase the supply of health workers to
medically underserved areas. Unlike non-financial incen-
tives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to
work in underserved areas; however, they may not
improve the working or living conditions in underserved
areas, which are important determinants of health work-
ers' long-term retention in those areas. Unlike compulsory
service policies, they will not be opposed by health work-
ers; however, they cannot guarantee that they supply
health workers to underserved areas who would not have
worked in such areas without financial incentives. Finan-
cial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory
service are not mutually exclusive and may positively
affect each other's performance.
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